The
latest chapter in the blood-soaked saga that is the history of the
Russian occupation of the Caucasus is still unfolding. The
hostage-taking and subsequent killing in Beslan, Ossetia, has
demonstrated the lengths to which Russia’s victims have been driven
in their desperation to end Moscow’s genocidal campaigns in the
mountain republics.
While
the trend in the aftermath of September 11 has been to portray any act
of terror as a motiveless, nihilistic crime, it would be
unconscionable and morally reprehensible to deny this event context;
specifically, the context of Russia’s horrifically brutal occupation
of Chechnya and its iron-fisted domination of the Muslim Caucasian
nations.
Little
is known of the militants who chose that day to take hundreds of
children and parents hostage. Not withstanding most Russian media’s
almost pathological distortions, the attackers appear to have been a
group of Caucasian Muslims drawn primarily from Ingushetia. Other
accounts suggest that Chechens and possibly Ossetians were involved.
All are likely, as there are few places in the Caucasus where Muslims
have not been persecuted in some shape or form by Russia or its
proxies.
Russian
authorities appear intent on deliberately downplaying the possible
presence of Chechens among the hostage-takers, perhaps in an attempt
to draw attention away from the killing fields in Chechnya and focus
it instead on the specter of Islamic terror. However, the LA Times
reports that while the hostage-taking in Beslan was still unfolding,
Russian special forces were moving rapidly within Chechnya, arresting
all known family members of both President Maskhadov and Commander
Basayev – including a 5-month baby. Some were beaten, their bones
broken. Russia’s justification for holding innocents and civilians
hostage, a practice they were simultaneously condemning in Ossetia,
epitomized a Soviet-style contempt for logic and truth: They’d
received warning that Basayev would have his own family killed to
blame it on the Russians, and therefore felt obliged to round them all
up for their own protection. It would appear that Russian
propagandists are still as lacking in finesse as their Soviet
predecessors were.
The
Beslan attack appears to have been, in some sense, a miscalculation.
It would appear that the militants calculated that Putin would not
risk another Dubrovka [the Moscow theater where Chechen fighters took
hundreds of Russians hostage in 2002], given the media fallout from
the bungled rescue that ended up killing over a hundred hostages. It
was a grievous error. Putin has demonstrated time and again a complete
disregard for human life. It was a fairly safe assumption that he
would authorize the storming of the school rather than being seen as
compromising with Chechen “separatists,” the suppression of whom
has always been a major plank in Putin’s campaign platform.
The
government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI) has disavowed any
and all links to the hostage-taking. However, statements by Chechen
representative Ahmed Zakaiev suggested that they could not completely
rule out the possibility that Chechen citizens, acting independently,
had been involved. The denials also included a warning that Putin’s
policies in the Caucasus would make more Beslans inevitable.
No
one mentioned Putin’s responsibility for the deaths of 40,000
Chechen children. |
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Observers
have often cited evidence of a divide within the ranks of the Chechen
resistance, as evidenced by Field Commander Shamil Basayev’s
adoption of various operations that targeted civilians as a
belligerent reprisal to Russian atrocities, versus Chechen President
Aslan Maskhadov’s denunciation of those same operations. Russia
finds it convenient to lump them together. However, it is not unlikely
that a group unaffiliated with either Basayev or Maskhadov may have
been involved in Beslan.
Basayev’s
contempt for international public opinion is not unique; it has become
the norm in a society brutalized by a decade of war. It is a cynicism
engendered by years of Western silence and complicity in Russia’s
genocide against the Chechens. Hence, while condemning the Beslan
hostage taking and concurring with the UN Security Council’s
denunciation thereof, CRI President Maskhadov noted with some
bitterness that no one had seen fit to mention Putin’s
responsibility for the deaths of some 40,000 Chechen children.
Russia
has gone ahead and placed a $10 million bounty on both Basayev and
Maskhadov, in a nod to US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is
however extremely doubtful that the Russians have evidence linking
either of them to the school attack. The bounty is more likely a
cynical attempt to milk the tragedy for all it’s worth, as was the
Moscow rally organized in the wake of the attack; a cheap publicity
stunt that had been organized prior to Beslan, in response to earlier
attacks in Moscow.
The
hostage taking has also reignited old ethnic hatreds, and there are
fears that there could be a repeat of the 1992 war between Ingushetia
and North Ossetia over the Prigorodnyi region. Tensions between the
Ingush and Ossetians have risen visibly in the aftermath of Beslan.
The British Guardian quoted Osettian individuals as expressing
a willingness to enlist to fight the Ingush again. In that sense, the
attack may indeed act as a catalyst for the further destabilization of
the Caucasus, a situation the Russians cannot afford. The region is
crucial for Russia’s energy infrastructure, both existing and
planned, as it is currently scrambling for a stake in the Caspian’s
oil riches, which necessitates firm control over Chechnya and
Dagestan. Politically, Putin has made it adequately clear that his
Stalin-esque vision for the future of Russia does not allow for a
further loss of territorial integrity or a reduction of its sphere of
influence. Judging by the number of children he allowed to die in
Beslan, these are aims for which Putin is obviously willing to pay any
cost.
The
crackdown on the press that coincided with the hostage taking also
speaks volumes about the lengths to which Putin is willing to go to
prevent interference in his scheming. The Beslan drama saw the arrest
of a Georgian television crew and the Al-Arabiyya Moscow bureau chief,
(the latter after a bullet was planted in his belongings).
Furthermore, two of Russia’s most prominent reporters (and the most
critical of the government) appear to have been deliberately targeted
to prevent them reaching Beslan. One was arrested in what appears to
have been a calculated provocation, the other was poisoned on the
flight to the Caucasus and suffered liver and kidney damage. The
latter, Anna Politkovskaya went on to point the finger of blame at
Putin’s FSB, the successors to the KGB. A third journalist, a
Georgian, was drugged while in Russian custody and passed out for 24
hours. The editor of one of Russia’s most prominent dailies, Izvestia,
was fired for the newspaper’s “negative” coverage of the crisis.
The paper was the first to publish an accurate estimate of the number
of hostages, which was around three times more than what the Russian
government was willing to admit. Other television channels were
ordered to cut parts of their footage of the hostage taking.
Various
questions about the bloody end to the hostage taking remain
unanswered. As has been pointed out by various analysts, incompetence
was the name of the game. Families of the victims were allowed
dangerously close to the building, rather than being held behind a
cordon at a suitable distance. When the exodus of children began from
the school, hysterical and armed family members rushed towards the
school in the chaos of the battle to confront the hostage takers,
possibly opening firing and injuring their own children.
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Chechen
civilians killed during the Russian invasion
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It
appears that the Russian Spetsnaz special forces had been ordered to
storm the school, belying official assurances that nothing would be
done to place the hostages at risk. However, events suggest that the
Spetznaz attempted to bring down a wall with explosives to force an
entry into the school, possibly triggering the explosives laid down by
the militants and almost certainly contributing to the massive death
toll. The Spetsnaz unit also seems to have used the cover of an
emergency services vehicle collecting bodies outside the school to
initiate the assault. Being a predictable tactic, it is almost certain
that the militants were prepared for it. This seems the most feasible
explanation, as there appears to be no reason why the Chechens would
have started detonating the bombs, and judging by the great disparity
in official accounts of the chain of events that culminated in the
death of hundreds of children.
In
other words, Russian officials deliberately ignored the inevitability
of the massive loss of civilian life that would result in the case of
an assault on the school. It was understood that a forced entry,
besides probably killing multiple hostages through the actual
demolition of the wall, would almost certainly start a chain-reaction
of explosions. A reporter from the Observer noted that all the bodies
he saw had died of the blasts, rather than gun fire, though one
wonders if the Spetsnaz could possibly have avoided gunning down
children in the smoke-filled havoc of the storming.
Russian
propaganda in the aftermath of the crisis was predictable, though
occasionally it was more colorful than usual (the hostage takers were
alleged to Ingush, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Arab “mercenaries”… and
Koreans.) Putin predictably lashed out at foreign journalists who
suggested that a reexamination of the policies that generated hatred
enough to target children en masse was in order. He self-righteously
declared that no one had the moral right to question Russia’s war on
terror, despite the fact that Putin himself seems to be responsible
for more Russian deaths than the militants.
Putin
adopted Bush’s rhethoric of “You’re either with us, or you are
with the terrorists,” immediately after September 11, but it was
never more evident – or more dangerous – than in the aftermath of
Beslan. The indignation, the utilization of terror as a moral cudgel
to beat opponents into line, and the deliberate attempt to deny the
existence of motivation or grievances that led to the carnage are the
hallmark of United States and Israeli policy.
Much
is at stake here, not least the lives of the already traumatized
Chechens, who’ve lived years under what is probably one of the most
brutal occupation regimes in the world. Putin looks like he’s
gearing up for an intensification of the zachistki or
“cleaning operations” that have left thousands of Chechens dead,
raped or maimed. Thousands more disappear into the notorious
“filtration camps,” where they are tortured and killed. According
to Memorial, a Russian human rights NGO, the statistics on
disappearances in Chechnya closely resemble those of Russia at the
peak of the Stalinist purges: 43 disappearances in every 10,000 in the
former compared to 44 in the latter.
The
atrocities inflicted on Chechnya have been buried far too long. |
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While
Putin has lectured at length on the dangers of “Wahhabism” and
Islamic militancy in the Caucasus, one would be hard pressed to think
of anything that would fuel militancy as effectively as his rampantly
anti-Islamic and horrifically brutal policies have. His co-optation of
the religious authorities in the Muslim republics has alienated the
people from the scholars affiliated with the government. The Russian
“muftis” statements condemning and “ex-communicating” people
left, right and center in the aftermath of Beslan therefore suffer
from serious credibility problems, given that these are the same
“scholars” who have remained suspiciously silent about the Islamic
perspective on Russia’s genocide of the Caucasian Muslims. Their
shameful tailoring of their fatwas, or jurisprudential rulings, to
suit Putin’s policies, their petty internal power struggles, and
their suspect credentials have cost them all Islamic standing,
reducing them to Islamically-garbed mouthpieces for the Russian
government. It would seem that Putin’s Islamic puppets, much like
his proxy governments in Chechnya and its neighboring republics, enjoy
neither credibility nor legitimacy.
Additionally,
talk of increased Israeli-Russian cooperation makes it considerably
easier to portray Putin’s campaigns as anti-Islamic, prompting
increasing resentment of Russia among Muslims around the world. It is
this belief that has prompted some Muslims to travel to Chechnya to
fight the Russian occupation, Muslims Russia then brands as
“mercenaries,” despite the fact that there is little material gain
to be made in the freezing wastelands of the Caucasus and almost
nothing to spend it on, coupled with the fact that a trip to Chechnya
is a one-way ticket from which even survivors cannot return, as they
would face arrest and prosecution almost anywhere in the world now.
Zakaiev’s
dire warning rings true. As long as the world chooses to
hypocritically disregard the plight of the Chechens, to ignore
Russia’s genocide against that tiny nation and its occupation and
repression of the Muslim republics of the Caucasus, there will always
be men and women desperate enough to commit such terrible acts of
violence against civilians. Appeals to humanity, pleas in the name of
a child’s innocence fall on deaf ears when addressed to those who
have lost their children, their brothers and sisters, their entire
families and seen their country laid to waste around them.
It
is tragic that it takes the deaths of 300 innocents to make the world
pay attention to the death of 200,000 innocents. The international
media’s fickle, cynical coverage has made the Chechens’ cries
worth noting only if they come drenched in Russian blood.
The
atrocities inflicted on Chechnya have been buried far too long. It is
time the world took a long, hard look at what their friends in the
Kremlin have been doing in the Caucasus.