|
Betwixt
the Conceptual and the Affective:
Hayy Ibn Yaqzan Revisited
|
By
Ahmed El-Sayed
A doctoral Student of Philosophy
|
28/07/2003
|
Born
in the year 506 A.H. (Islamic Calendar), or 1110 A.C., Ibn Tufayl
has widely been esteemed as one of the most eminent Arab and
Islamic philosophers and physicians. Although he was a
prolific writer in multifarious fields, like medicine and astronomy,
what he is most famous for of his extant work is his worldwide
acclaimed treatise “Hayy Ibn Yaqzan”.
The
several, repeated Latin, French and Spanish translations of this
exceptionally eloquent and philosophically profound treatise are
often considered indicative of its value and its far-reaching
influence on medieval and the later renaissance philosophy. Though this magnificent treatise of philosophical literature could
very well be read as an attempt on the part of Ibn Tufayl to establish
a reconciliation between religion and rational speculation as lot of
his predecessors and contemporaries were wont to do, there is
philosophically and religiously more to it than this merely
ideological motif.
As
Hayy, the protagonist and avatar of the immediate, primordial and
indeed theoretically non-positing inquiry into being, develops the
reader gets appositely presented with a series of original and
stunningly deep insights that artfully maps the trajectory that
philosophical reasoning is wont to follow. Not only does
Hayy arrive at the necessary existence of God by dint of reason, but
he proceeds further with his investigation to identify the
limitations of such an identification vehicle. At a
climax-like point of enlightenment, Hayy realizes the primacy and
power of the affective experience of God in the worldly sphere. Even his purely immediate faculty of reason and consciousness has to
be overcome to allow all his rational and animal turbulences to
settle and attend to the concrete flood of the divine. Getting
acquainted with the orthodox rituals of traditional religion, Hayy
is filled with frustration and is resolved to return to his marooned
isolation and rejoice in his solitary yet more authentic experience
of God .
What
is in Between?
Ibn Tufayl constructs the literary imagery of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan to portray the actuality of what he envisioned the natural dialectical development towards truth. |
|
In
a move that is quintessentially Aristotelian, Ibn Tufayl sets
out to investigate the telos (end goal) of oriental philosophy and
wisdom in the experience of communion with God; the affective
experience that can only be attended to in the actual instance of
the lives of those who earned its matchless joy and rejoiced in its
ineffable splendor. In a manner similar to Aristotle's
characterization of happiness in the Nichomachean Ethics, Ibn
Tufayl asserts that his (quite corresponding)
being-in-communion-with-God is conceptually irreducible; ideally,
then, it is to be sought in actual sphere of experience. Further, such exalted mode of being is posited as the necessary
culmination of any inquiry into the dynamics and character of being. To demonstrate this claim, Ibn Tufayl constructs the literary
imagery of Hayy Ibn Yaqzan to portray the actuality of what he
envisioned the natural dialectical development towards truth. This path is systematically delineated as Hayy advances from the
initial child wander through the accumulation of empirical knowledge
by trial and error, the discovery of the faculty of reason, the
rationally deduced proof of the necessary existence of the divine,
and the investigation of the attributes exclusively specific to Him until
the concluding recognition of the limitations of reason vis-à-vis
the irreducible affective wholeness of the one. All of his
intermittent moments of intellectual frustration (vis-à-vis those
of ecstatic enlightenment, existential anxieties and crises,
bewildered inquiries, emotional ambivalences and affective
repressions and paroxysms) correspond quite stunningly to different
moments in the history of philosophy from the Pre-Socratics down to
him. Commencing with a recounting of the decisive infliction points
and the momentous transformations of Hayy’s life, our undertaking
will endeavor to explore and interrogate the philosophical
foundations of Hayy’s propositions.
Demonstrating
his profound understanding of the structure of reason and its
essentially negative mode of knowing, Ibn Tufayl aptly chooses
Hayy’s first experience of absolute negation and existentially
imposing anxiety at the death of his doe-mother to mark the
initation of Hayy’s lifetime inquiry. Starting with
the dissection and the observation of the dynamics of the elements
of his immediate experience, Hayy begins to develop his own
cosmogony—model of origin of the world. In his description
of such an undertaking, Ibn Tufayl critically surveys most of the
philosophical propositions of ancient Greek antiquity, starting with
the Pre-Socratic idea of the four primeval elements and down to the
matter-form primacy debate between Aristotle and Plato. As
time elapses, Hayy’s understanding of the world progresses in a
dialectical process in which his inductively formulated theses
either cancel or reinforce each other, up to the point at which he
arrives at the principle of causality. By that time Hayy
has already found out two important ontological facts; first, that
despite the plurality of things an underlying oneness always seems
to ground being; and second, that there is always something, namely
the soul, that transcends sheer physicality. As he traced the chain
of causes, Hayy eventually came to realize that there must be a
cause that is prior to the world and that it can’t exist within
the sphere of space and time. Such cause is God, the
necessarily existent. At this moment he realizes that
consciousness, the investigative tool he has used to recognize the
existence of God is, like Stoics, the divine manifestation in man. Further, he came to the conclusion that the only way to reach
happiness in life and experience a proper death is to always be in
the presence of such all-powerful necessarily existent. To achieve that, he embraces his three modes of existence, namely,
as an animal, a heavenly body—which he deemed higher than animals
and more devoted to the divine—and as in communion with the
necessarily existent. As for the first one, as an animal, Ibn
Tufayl, seems to espouse the stoic prescription to eat only what is
sufficient to sustain you, and to always try to add to the cycle of
life by replacing whatever you consume by means of prudent use and
cultivation. The perfection of the second mode, that of
a heavenly body, was, to Hayy, to spend the longest time possible in
a detached meditative state to free himself of all distractions,
disturbances of desires and animal temptations. To achieve the third
and highest mode of being, the communion with the divine, Hayy
decided that since transcendence of physicality is the constitutive
feature of God he should relentlessly try to die to himself, to
always experience his nothingness. Regarding this as the highest
possible form of communion with God, Hayy was quite disappointed
when he left his island to see how ordinary religious communities
worship God. He thought that there way was quite reductive and
unsatisfactory to the necessarily existent.
Hayy Ibn Yaqzan is the Islamic literary extrapolation of Aristotle’s actuality-oriented
ethics |
|
Having
introduced the main ideas Ibn Tufayl puts forwards in Hayy Ibn
Yaqzan, we can move on to an analysis of such theses. To begin with,
it could be said that Hayy Ibn Yaqzan is the Islamic literary
extrapolation of Aristotle’s actuality-oriented ethics. The way
Hayy’s reasoning on nature evolved into a highly complex belief in
God clearly demonstrates this point. Ibn Tufayl emphatically
asserts that reason and rational inquiry are never sufficient as a
proper ground for what, as he intimates, could be described as the
fully actualized experience of and most irreducible mode of
comportment towards God. In the process of knowing, the
knowing subject is still fully aware of himself as he identifies,
appropriates and constructs the objects of experience. Riding
himself of his ego was Hayy’s way to achieve communion with God;
the stage at which all turbulences of conscious subjectivity settle
down and one becomes but a mirror wherein the divine can manifest
Himself. Substantially then, Ibn Tufayl supports the view that
calls for a return to the primordial unity with the world. On
the way to redeeming this unity, reason plays an important role as
it dialectically proceeds from one thesis to the other. Once reason
hits its limits at the question of God—the thing which is, in its
own right, quite Kantian—affective experience should be allowed to
give itself as the province where meaning in its authenticity and
full concretion unfolds. Though Ibn Tufayl does not thus
formulate the point, the least that could be said in this respect is
that he quite embraces a view of reason that is most akin to that of
the conception of nous (the rational part of the human soul) in the
Pre-Socratic tradition. Such a path of thinking tends to
understand reason, qua a discourse, not as identical with the
rational: the conceptualizing faculty that is necessarily governed
by a rigidly defined set of laws otherwise labeled “transcendental
logic”, but rather as a whole aura of experience where no trace of
the classical subject-–object dichotomy exists. The similarity to
Aristotle has hence unfolded. Positing authentic actual
experience rather than intellectual abstraction as the condition for
happiness and communion with God, renders Hayy Ibn Yaqzan thereby
the Islamic version of Aristotle’s ethics.
The authentic and full experience of God is one that goes beyond the fetters of the rational and is accordingly one that is grounded in the more basic and indeed immediate realm of affectivity |
|
However,
two questions pressingly emerge. The first is as regards language;
Hayy operated in a complete absence of any linguistic experience. Accordingly, the path of his thought was disburdened of all
cumulatively hermeneutical sophistication, as is usually the case in
any form of human society. In other words, the immediacy of his
primordial experience of the worldly-given was not over burdened
with the restraints of the pre-molded sets of concepts and
definitions the human agent is bound to linguistically function
within as it socially evolves. But is such linguistically void
experience of the world an authentically immediate one or is it
rather objectively reified?; as such man comports itself towards and
associates with the world through its capacity to discourse. But how
and within what experiential sphere is such discourse possible? It
is possible through language. Yet what, if it is at all
possible to interrogate language through a “what”, is that which
we call language? Is it the totality of words, concepts and
definitions visually illustrated in terms of script. If so would not
this ultimately amount to the problem of the appropriation of
meaning and the overloading of language that hay was spared as he
evolved in complete isolation from any form of encounter with the
human other? It certainly would. So what is that that we call the
authentic form of language? That is the vocalized form, place of the
occurrence of language, the voice. Being sequestrated deprived Hayy
of the verbal experience of voice and utterance. Thus his immediate
experience of language as the realm of the authentic manifestation
of being was impinged on by the absence of voice, the actual opening
in which language reaches its full concretion and wherein the
ethical emerges in the summoning of the other, the opening that in
its won right ontologically grounds for and makes possible the
meaning of the communal (or ummah) in Islam. So if the
authentic and full experience of God is one that goes beyond the
fetters of the rational and is accordingly one that is grounded in
the more basic and indeed immediate realm of affectivity; how could
it possible to thus be in complete solitude? In other words how is
affectivity at all possible in the absence of the other and so the
absence of language?
Further
what is also quite paradoxical is the repudiation of the body that
Hayy has reached and axiomatically maintained. If the essential
animal needs are inescapable and if we need to continuously be in
the presence of God, how can my body, the most immediate medium of
affective experience be marginalized? The Platonic
tendencies towards formal abstraction of Ibn Tufayl have obviously
swayed him in this respect. In order to secure the rigor of the
argument, the role of the body which is already emphasized in the
Islamic creed and enactments should have been acknowledged.
Otherwise, the problem of over-conceptualization that the logical
interpretation of Islam would not even partially resolved.
The originality of its ideas and their timeless
relevance and importance will continue to intrigue speculative minds
especially at moments of crisis like the one we are presently living |
|
Notwithstanding
any criticism, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan definitively stands as an
exceptionally philosophically insightful piece of classical Arabic
literature. The originality of its ideas and their timeless
relevance and importance will continue to intrigue speculative minds
especially at moments of crisis like the one we are presently
living, moments at which the need for re-discovering what has
already been discovered appears to be must to redeem, to the
presence of thinking, what has long been consigned to oblivion.
|