Islamic legislation is often viewed in some writings—both ancient and modern—as non-existent or extremely rare in the Meccan Quran. Some legal theorists (Usulis) hold that the “verses of rulings” in the Holy Quran are generally few and limited. Some even count and specify them numerically. Across all statistics or estimates, these verses range between one hundred and fifty and a few hundred.…

This constriction—or miserliness—in estimating the verses of rulings stems, first, from a narrowing of the concepts of Sharia, legislation, and legal rulings, and second, from restricting the concept of “rulings” solely to direct, applied, particular rulings. Consequently, the universals, rules, and overarching major judgments with which the Holy Quran abounds become obscured.

The issue did not stop at differences in nomenclature and terminology, or at the classification of rulings and legal requirements based on this or that approach. Rather, it extended and transformed into a significant degree of neglect and failure to apply textual and universal rules, along with disregarding their foundational sourcehood and authority in deducing and guiding rulings…

We find that most esteemed commentators (Mufassirun), upon reaching universal verses, usually pass over them lightly, and some do not pause at certain ones at all. Yet when they reach a verse concerning a partial, direct jurisprudential topic, they stop and linger long. They analyze and rationalize, probe and turn over every stone, deepening and scrutinizing…

Similarly, many esteemed jurists (Fuqaha), when researching a particular jurisprudential ruling, gather every piece of relevant partial texts, statements of the predecessors, opinions of the successors, analogies, deductions, and comparisons they can find. Some of these may be explicit, others inappropriate, or only weakly connected to the case or new incident under research. Yet they rarely resort to the generalities, universals, principles, and objectives (Maqasid) of the Sharia. They seldom allow these universals to act as ruling and decisive forces in any given issue. If some of them do turn to these universals, it is usually merely by way of a preface or literary embellishment. This is contrary to the methodology of well-grounded scholars and pioneering Imams.

Once, I watched a religious television program dedicated to addressing the scourge of car accidents on roads and the catastrophic consequences they produce in terms of lives, bodies, and property.

A jurist was brought on to address the problem from an Islamic perspective and explain Islam’s rulings on the matter.

The jurist proceeded to recall and recite every possible sacred text and jurisprudential opinion he could muster regarding roads, road etiquette, rules of road usage, the ethics of patience and avoiding haste, gentleness, tolerance, altruism, the obligation of kindness toward animals, and the prohibition of exhausting them with excessive speed or loads beyond their capacity.

It was clear to me that the jurist had taken an approach that was “much effort with little fruit.” The texts, rulings, and manners he mentioned required a massive effort to link to the topic and demonstrate their relevance to what was requested. In the end, this might or might not be achieved, and if achieved, it would be faint and weak in impact because he was reasoning from texts and rulings originally revealed for vastly different, fundamentally dissimilar issues—some of which amount to no more than recommended manners and virtues that bind no one and deter no one.

As for the approach that is entirely fruitful, direct, and effortless, it is the approach of reasoning through universals.

First, the jurist must acknowledge and recognize that this issue—and thousands like it—is new, lacking specific, direct, partial texts and rulings dedicated to its subject matter.

This narrowing in estimating the verses of rulings stems, first, from the constriction of the concept of Sharia, legislation, and legal rulings, and second, from restricting the concept of “rulings” to direct, applied, particular rulings. Thus, the universals, rules, and major judgments brimming in the Holy Quran are absent.

Here, recourse must be made to the universals of the Sharia and its general objectives. The issue at hand relates to grave, catastrophic harms inflicted upon people in their lives, bodies, and wealth. When the jurist examines the issue through the lens of universals, its rulings, requirements, and demands become brilliantly clear, vivid, and decisive.

He can invoke the universal texts concerning the preservation of lives, bodies, and wealth, which are robust and rich.

He can place the issue within the framework of the Five Universals [1], which all religions and legal systems have universally agreed to exalt, preserve, and regard as supreme interests for the human race and human life.

He can address it in accordance with the legal framework governing interests, harms, benefits, and detriments.

Through all these gateways—some of which can be integrated with others—the necessary obligations, prohibitions, measures, and penalties are determined.…

In this way, the sphere of reasoning and Ijtihad expands, freeing itself from artificiality, coercion, tortuous analogies, and exhausting deductions.

This applies to all new issues and circumstances that differ fundamentally from ancient conditions and issues for which specific texts or circumstantial jurisprudential opinions were handed down. Transplanting these texts and opinions away from their actual rationales and contexts, and then forcing their implementation onto situations, rationales, and circumstances that differ in nature and reality, is nothing less than coercion and an assault upon those texts and opinions, just as it is an assault upon people and their interests.

We are spared this coercion by taking refuge in the expansiveness of universals and general legal formulas, which were only established in their universality and generality to rescue people through their guidance and general ruling—a ruling capable of absorbing countless, unending emergent cases and particulars. Equally authoritative is recourse to inductive universals based on the totality of detailed rulings. Shihab al-Din al-Zinjani transmitted from Imam al-Shafi’i that he permitted holding fast to interests grounded in the universals of the Sharia, even if no specific partial evidence attested to them. Al-Zinjani then stated:

“Al-Shafi’i argued for this on the grounds that partial occurrences are endless, and the rulings for occurrences are similarly uncountable. The partial principles from which we extract meanings and rationales are limited and finite, and the finite cannot suffice for the infinite. Therefore, there must be another way to establish partial rulings, which is to hold fast to interests founded upon the foundations and objectives of the Sharia in a universal manner, even if it does not rest on a partial origin.” [2]

By Ahmed Al-Raysuni